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Abstract
In this work, we briefly introduce and discuss some of the diversity measures used in Ecology. After a
succinct description and analysis of the most relevant ones, we single out the Shannon-Weiner index. We
justify why it is the most informative and relevant one for measuring software diversity. Then, we show
how it can be used for effectively assessing the diversity of various real software ecosystems. We discover
in the process a frequently overlooked software monopoly, and its key security implications. We finally
extract some conclusions from the results obtained, focusing mostly on their security implications.
1 Introduction
1.1 Some Biological Examples
It has long been appreciated in Biology that monocultures are extremely vulnerable to pathogens. One
particularly notable example is the Irish potato Great Famine in the XIX century, caused by Phytophthora
infestans and exacerbated by a disproportionate percentage of all potatoes grown in Ireland being from the
same variety (Irish Lumper).
Another interesting example is the near extinction caused by the fungus Fusarium oxysporum of the once
very popular Gros Michel banana. This variety was replaced commercially around 1950 by the nowadays
omnipresent Dwarf Cavendish banana variety, which was also turned into a massive monocultive. This plants
are all clones (i.e genetically identical), so they cannot evolve any resistance to new diseases. The parallelism
with current software is striking. Unsurprisingly, the Cavendish clones, so popular in our supermarkets,
seem to be about to suffer a similar fate at the hands of a very related pathogen Panama disease, Fusarium
oxysporum Tropical Race 4 [15].
1.2 Diversity in Computer Science & Security
This well studied phenomenon in Ecology, where many more examples than the two previously cited exist,
has being observed also in Software ecosystems. Attempts to extrapolate this concept to Software have been,
however, unsucessful mostly due to the lack of a proper way to quantitatively measure diversity.
So far, the consequences and claims published in the literature were mostly based in common sense and
intuition. The lack of a quantitative way of measuring diversity hindered to some extend the credibility
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(a) The Gros Michel banana.
(b) The Cavendish banana.
Figure 1: The Gros Michel banana is now almost extinct and no longer viable for commercial exploitation because
of its massive popularity and consequent monoculture in the first half of the 20th century. The Cavendish banana,
seriously threaten now by a variant of same pathogen that wroke havoc 50 years ago on the Gros Michel, is another
example of the dangers of massive monoculture in the Biological World.
of the arguments displayed, and made difficult if not impossible to compare different ecosystems to decide
where more urgent action was needed.
We try to address this problem in our work by briefly introducing some well-known diversity measures
used in Biology and Ecology, and then proposing what we believe is the most informative and useful one,
called the Shannon-Wiener index. After doing so, we show how it can be applied to a number of different
Software ecosystems, and the security implications that can be extracted from the results obtained.
Diversity in software was first proposed for safety, not security, in the context of fault tolerance [16].
Then, N-version programming attempted to build functionally equivalent but completely different code by
isolating N independent teams of developers with a common specification [3]. A majority vote is applied
to the result, and in this way robustness is achieved against a low number (< N2 ) of faults. The aim is, of
course, to obtain failure diversity by this procedure, but unfortunately later experiments showed this was
not the case [13], though improvements where obtained.
Forrest and her colleagues have also contributed significantly to apply concepts from Biology to Computer
Security, explicitly stating [6] that diversity could reduce the impact of any security weakness. They say:
“Diversity is an important source of robustness in biological systems”, and even more importantly for the
aims of this paper “A stable ecosystem, contains many different species which occur in highly-conserved
frequency distributions. If this diversity is lost and a few species become dominant, the ecosystem becomes
susceptible to perturbations such as catastrophic fires, infestations, and disease.” They furthermore propose
some general countermeasures to increase diversity, such as avoiding unnecessary consistency, adding or
deleting non-functional code, code reordering and some memory allocation techniques. These and other
similar ideas for automatically increasing diversity at a relatively low cost have been explored further: the
two main research paths are based on memory rearrangement [2][19] and randomising the instruction set
[1]. Another promising approach, loosely based on the N-version concept, to inject automated diversity and
provide detection and disruption against attacks, is N-variant systems [4] [14] [18].
Software monocultures as a security threat have been explicitly studied before, most notably by Dan Geer
in [5] and Geer et al. in [8]. These two documents focused mainly on the risks to cybersecurity posed by the
dominance of Microsoft’s products. Geer, then Chief Technical Officer and founding member of AtStake,
was fired by his employer for publishing the first report. AtStake was a supplier to Microsoft who, to put
it mildly, did not like the research at all. Particularly assertions like this one “Governments must set an
example with their own internal policies and with the regulations they impose on industries critical to their
societies. They must confront the security effects of monopoly and acknowledge that competition policy is
entangled with security policy from this point forward”, or “The threats to international security posed by
Windows are significant, and must be addressed quickly”. Another notable early work on the dangers of
monoculture is [17], where the author describes the impact of the W32/Blaster worm in August 2003, and
concludes “More diversity in the OS market would have limited the number of susceptible systems, thereby
reducing the level of infection”.
Two relatively recent studies clearly show statistically significant evidence of the security benefits of using
environment with very diverse software. In a particularly insightful work [7] 18 years worth of vulnerabil-
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ities (2270) were investigated, targeting 11 different Operating Systems, and the results showed that large
potential security gains could be attained from using diverse operating systems in a replicated intrusion-
tolerant system. Authors presented several strategies for system designers to optimally choose the best
combination of operating systems and, curiously enough, came with the same solution regardless of which
type of vulnerability was more relevant for a particular system. This optimal combination was one including
OpenBSD, Debian, Solaris and Windows 2003. That was proved to be the best possible combination of just
four operating systems for an intrusion-tolerant configuration, for their particular dataset.
Another seminal piece of work on the effectiveness of software diversity for security is [10]. It presents,
similarly to the previous study, a systematic analysis of security vulnerabilities published in 2007. It focus
particularly in using diversity for intrusion detection, and in measuring how effective is one of the cheapest
diversity-increasing measure of them all: just combining different off-the-shelf software. The results are really
encouraging and statistically significant, as they hold over the more than 6000 vulnerabilities published in
2007 they studied.
1.3 Organisation of the Paper
This paper is organised as follows: First, we briefly introduce in section 2 a number of the most significant
diversity measures used in Ecology. Later, we criticise them following closely the arguments and reasoning
of Lou Jost [12], and justify why we believe the modified Shannon-Wiener is the best suited for our purpose.
In section 2.1 we show some examples of how this diversity measure can be applied, starting with some toy
examples. Afterwards, in section 3 we use it in different real and current software ecosystems. We later
analyse in detail the results obtained, particularly regarding their security implications. We finish with some
conclusions in section 4 and present some biologically inspired ideas for further work in section 5.
2 Diverse Diversity Measures
2.1 Ecological Diversity Measures
According to Lou Jost [12], a well-known ecologist specialised in diversity, the main diversity indexes that
have been used in Biology in the past have been quite misleading. They led on a number of occasions to
wrong conclusions and erroneous interpretations of the data. Often-times researchers came to the depressing
conclusion that diversity could not be measured. As Jost puts it: “The plethora of diversity indices and
their conflicting behavior has led some authors [...] to conclude that the concept of diversity is meaningless”.
Another undesirable consequence is that the results of different researchers, favouring different indexes, where
frequently impossible to compare.
Jost describes the whole problem quite lucidly: “The radius of a sphere is an index of its volume but is not
itself the volume, and using the radius in place of the volume in engineering equations will give dangerously
misleading results. This is what biologists have done with diversity indices.”
He considers in his seminal work [11] entropic measures such as the Gini-Simpson, the Shannon-Wiener,
the Renyi, the Tallis/HCDT and other related concepts such as species richness, Simpson concentration and
similar ones. He criticises many of these indexes as not being diversities at all, and claims these confusions
have lots of practical implications.
For trying to address this problem, he focuses on a very simple population composed of S equally common
species, and observes that for most of these indexes we will not obtain the most natural diversity value of
S but something ranging from log(S) to 1/S or even 1− 1/S. Some will be confined to a value in the [0, 1]
interval, while others can range up to∞. He strongly argues that all indexes cannot be called diversities and
treated interchangeably. He additionally poises that their mathematical characteristics do not reflect at all
the intuition that Biologists have of the concept of diversity1. For solving these problems and to put different
diversity indexes in an equal footing, he proposed to turn them into what he calls true diversities. He offers
1The properties intuitively expected of a diversity by Jost are two: 1. It always returns S when applied to a community
with S equally-common species, and 2. It possess the doubling property, i.e. : suppose we have a community of S species
with arbitrary frequencies p1, ...pi, ...ps, with diversity D. Suppose we divide each species into two equal groups, say males and
females, and we treat each group as a separate species. Intuitively, we have doubled the diversity of the community by this
reclassification, and indeed the diversity of the doubled community should be 2D.
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a list of mathematical transformations that can convert each of them into a proper diversity measure, with
all the required properties.
The transformations will change any of the measures into real diversities, and he suggests that the
common unit of species diversity should be called the effective number of species.
After applying the proposed transformations, these different values will behave as intuitively expected2,
and become fully meaningful.
Of all the studied indices, the Shannon-Wiener seems to be, for a number of mathematical reasons detailed
in [11], the most adequate. It is even called by Jost the “most profound and useful of all diversity indices”. It
has also the advantage to be intimately related to the well-known concept of entropy in Information Theory.
The problem is that, as it stands in equation 1:
H(S) = −
S∑
i=1
pi ln(pi). (1)
it is not a true diversity.
Fortunately, it is quite easy to convert it into one, by applying exponentiation as in the following equation:
D(S) = expH(S) = exp−
∑S
i=1 pi ln(pi) . (2)
Of course, equation 2 can be trivially simplified into
D(S) = expH(S) = exp−
∑S
i=1 pi ln(pi) =
S∏
i=1
1
ppii
. (3)
but curiously enough, we did not find this straightforward transformation in the original paper.
So the units of this diversity value D are equivalent species number3 and they admit an easy and intuitive
interpretation as the number of equally distributed species that will achieve an equivalent diversity.
Let us see an extremely simple example:
Species 1 2 3 4
Community A 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Community B 0.25 0.75 0 0
Community C 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Following equation 2, we have that
H(A) = −
4∑
i=1
1
4
ln(
1
4
) = − ln(1
4
) = ln(4)
D(A) = expln(4) = 4
or, alternatively
D(A) =
S∏
i=1
1
ppii
= ((4)
1
4 )4 = 4
So we have the quite intuitive value of 4 esn (effective number of species), which is the maximum at-
tainable with 4 species.
2For example, in a community where all species are equally common, diversity should be proportional to the number of
species. This very intuitive property is not met by the Shannon-Weiner entropy before the proposed conversion into a true
diversity, but it holds after it.
3We will abbreviate them as esn in the following.
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Similarly,
H(B) = −
2∑
i=1
pi ln(pi) = −1
4
ln(
1
4
)− 3
4
ln(
3
4
) = 0.34657 + 0.21576 = 0.56233
D(B) = exp0.56233 = 1.75476
or, alternatively
D(B) =
S∏
i=1
1
ppii
= 4
1
4 · (4
3
)
3
4 = 1.75476
It is interesting to note that Community B is significantly less diverse that Community A, where diversity
is maximal. Also, it is quite intuitive that, as there are only 2 species in Community B its diversity should be
upper bounded by 2 esn. A further conclusion would be that, as these two species are not equidistributed,
the diversity should be lower than 2 esn. The computed result of roughly 1.75 esn is consistent with all
these intuitions.
As a last example, let us check what happens in Community C. Without a diversity measure as the one
at hand, it would be not easy to compare the diversities of Communities B and C. Thanks to this concept,
this can be done effortlessly:
D(C) =
S∏
i=1
1
ppii
= 10
1
10 · 5 15 · (10
3
)
3
10 · (5
2
)
2
5 = (
5
3
3
10
) = 3.59611
The result obtained seems to confirm the intuitive idea that the diversity of Community C is much
higher that that of Community B. In fact, it is not that far away from the maximal one of 4 esn observed
in Community A.
3 Diversity of Some Software Ecosystems
For seeing how the diversity measure that we just introduced can be applied to real life scenarios, not only
to the toy examples shown in Section 2.1, we will explain in the following our analysis of two particular
ecosystems that surprised us for their extremely poor diversity. We have additionally included another
interesting ecosystem for comparison’s sake.
3.1 Desktop Operating Systems
It will hardly come as a surprise to anyone, particularly after the efforts of Geer et al. in [5], but we have
been able to confirm their finding and, above all, to put a figure to the intuitive quite clear fact that this
ecosystem suffers from very poor diversity.
Let us analyze these results in greater detail. They are shown in Table 3.1 below:
Operating System Market Share
Windows 91.51%
Mac 7.20%
Linux 1.28%
Applying our proposed diversity measure we get that the diversity for this ecosystem is just 1.386 esn.
This is an extremely small figure that is never found in any living ecosystem, not even in those heavily altered
by farming. This is also a clear indication of the enormous rewards that can be extracted from investing in
more complex and sophisticated attacks in this ecosystem. All in all, very worrying though not unexpected.
This fully justifies the work of Geer et al. but also shows very little has changed in the last 10 years.
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Figure 2: The Desktop Operating System market, as measured by NetMarketShare in June 2013.
Many would dispute the figure of 1.386 esn, arguing that this classification of all Desktop operating
systems into three groups is too coarse and misses important details. This may be partly true, so we wanted
to investigate the other end of the spectrum, when we (wrongly!) assume that different versions of different
desktop operating systems are completely unrelated. This scenario is show below:
Operating System Market Share
Windows 7 44.37%
Windows XP 37.17%
Windows 8 5.10%
Windows Vista 4.62%
Mac OS X 10.8 3.14%
Mac OS X 10.6 1.76%
Mac OS X 10.7 1.73%
Linux 1.28%
Mac OS X 10.5 0.43%
Windows NT 0.19%
Mac OS X 10.4 0.10%
Windows 2000 0.04%
Mac OS X 10.9 0.02%
Mac OS X NVR 0.02%
Windows 64 0.01%
With the figures shown in Table 3.1, the diversity of this ecosystem is 3.971 esn. This is still too low
in comparison with living ecosystems, and a clear demonstration of the poor diversity of this market. Of
course, the real figures will lay somewhere in between these two values of 1.386 and 3.971 esn, possibly
much closer to the lower due to millions of common lines of code between many of the OS that we treat
here as different. In any case, these figures reveal that added diversity is much needed in this ecosystem for
increased security.
3.2 Supercomputers
A much more surprising finding in the course of our research is that the Desktop Operating System market
is not the only with a worryingly low diversity, and that it is not even the worst offender.
The values shown in figure 4 lead to a shocking diversity measure of 1.269 esn, even worse that the one
for the Desktop PC operating systems.
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Figure 3: The Desktop Operating System market by OS version, according to NetMarketShare in June 2013
Figure 4: OS evolution of Top 500 supercomputers in the World on June 2013, from http://www.top500.org
Recent news [9] have shown the first publicly disclosed attack against supercomputers. Most of these
have supposedly very tough access control policies and high security levels, so it is possible that miscreants
have also discovered the vulnerability of this ecosystem and are increasingly targeting it, particularly now
that access to massive computational power can be cashed-in almost instantly and with some anonymity
thanks to cryptocoins such as Bitcoin and LiteCoin. We predict much more attacks of this type in the future,
unless something is done to revert the extreme monoculture highlighted by our work, that translates into
very poor diversity and hence extreme vulnerability due to the enormous attraction of massive impact and
replication of a single weakness or exploit.
Most authors in the past have covered the security implication of Microsoft’s monopoly [5][8][17], but very
few have extended these critics to other markets. We are the first to highlight another crucial environment
(very attractive for intellectual property theft, scientific knowledge stealing, cryptocoin mining, etc.) which
has even lower diversity, and to ask for direct and quick measures to be put in place to protect this critical
infrastructure.
3.3 Mobile and Tablet Operating System
Another well-known market where poor diversity has been repeatedly been cited as one of the main causes
of its multiple security problems is that of mobile and tablet operating systems.
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Figure 5: The Mobile and Tablet Operating System market in June 2013, by NetMarketShare.
The figures obtained from NetMarketShare on this ecosystem, schematically shown in Figure 5, lead to a
diversity of 3.29 esn at the OS level and 7.305 esn at the version level. As in the case analysed in 3.1, the
real diversity will lie somewhere between these two values, probably much closer to the lower end due to the
enormous similarities (and hence vulnerability exposure) of Android versions 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.0,
4.1, 4.2 and the iOS versions used in the iPad, iPhone and iPod, that are all, quite unrealistically, treated
as unrelated in the version level analysis.
This diversity is, anyway, really poor by any of the standars found in natural ecosystems, but relatively
high if compared with the rest of pathologically poor markets analysed in this paper.
4 Conclusions
There is a remarkable parallelism between massive farming and the fact that hundreds of millions of ex-
act software clones (OS, databases, webservers, etc.) exist across the Internet. Due to this monoculture,
they offer a particularly attractive target that can potentially lead to tens of millions of compromised ma-
chines. And that with only a single vulnerability or exploit. The analogy with the Irish potato or the Gros
Michel/Cavendish banana is clear. This lack of diversity can be used to create large botnets that generate
huge profits for criminals by launching DDoS attacks, mining cryptocoins, etc. But many other software
ecosystems suffer from a lack of diversity that, thanks to our work, can only now be measured and compared
quantitatively.
We have confirmed that a very well known and large market (that of Desktop OS) has indeed very low
diversity, fully supporting the arguments of Geer et al. But we have also discovered a frequently forgot
ecosystem (that of the top 500 supercomputers4) that has even worst characteristics, and could lead to very
serious security compromises of some of the most powerful computers on Earth. There is some evidence
that attacks aiming at these supercomputers have recently taken place, possibly taking advantage (the
criminal boasted having obtained access to almost half of the top 500 supercomputers) of their extreme
lack of diversity. Claims like that become, unfortunately, quite believable thanks to its very poor diversity.
This top-500 ecosystem is curious and quite interesting in itself. Many authors have previously blamed
Microsoft’s monopoly aspirations and its blind desire for profit as one of the leading explanations for the
lack of diversity in desktop OS environments. This narrative, of course, does not apply to the top-500 market
where the dominating OS is a free open source one. We have to seek other reasons for this undesirable state
of affairs, and most likely apply different measures to correct it.
We believe urgent actions should be taken to force a significant increase in the diversity of critical software
ecosystems. One could argue that this is by no means straightforward to achieve (particularly in the OS
Desktop market) as economic offer and demand forces act over it. This is only partly true and, as requested
4These are very attractive targets. Access to them will grant privileged knowledge of confidential scientific and even military
data. It can even allow attackers to tamper with the result of scientific and military experiments, inducing rivals to abandon
or revise theories and gaining valuable intelligence and commercial insights.
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by Geer et al. in [8], governments could do much more to adapt their software and hardware contracts (some
of these including blocks of millions of machines) to explicitly increase their overall diversity to acceptable
levels. The role of a correct government policy could be even greater in niche ecosystems such as the top-500,
where many of the supercomputers are in full or in part government-owned.
Increased diversity will likely stop the now common phenomenon on botnets with millions of compromised
machines, significantly reducing their size and increasing the investment wrongdoers have to put to herd so
many machines, seriously limiting their profits.
Of course, higher diversity should ideally be implemented by automatic means such as those mentioned in
Section 1.2. Advances in this area will have a high impact for improving the overall security of the Internet.
But it is also true that managing different version of the same software could imply some extra costs in
terms of maintenance and support. Fortunately, as shown in [10] and [7], there are much cheaper options
that actually work quite well by simply increasing he diversity of the main off-the-shelf components of a
software system. Moves in this direction will very beneficial for security and will guarantee less exposure
to vulnerabilities, while other techniques such as address space layout randomization, randomisation of the
instruction set, N-variants and others [2][19][1][4][14][18] are fully deployed.
5 Future Works
We acknowledge the limitations of the techniques we show in this work to predict exposure to cybersecurity
attacks, particularly because diversity is a measure taken at a certain time and, as an isolated photography,
does not tell the whole story. That said, our findings also point out towards the fact that no real life
ecosystems (not even massive farms) would have such a low diversity as the ones encountered in this work.
One possible next step could be to use this new capability of precisely measuring diversity to, in a similar
way to how it is done for other species, compute the probability of survival of a given software ecosystem.
Biologists use for that some simple models and run multiple simulations that try to predict the evolution of
each species, and see how many of them survive for how long in how many simulations. There is no reason
to believe this could not be also done for software ecosystems, possibly with different models, and we believe
exploring this path of linking diversity and extinction probability is a worthy pursuit.
We will also use the new presented quantitative measure of diversity for studying how different software
ecosystems evolve on a yearly basis and, possibly, trigger alarms when diversity levels drop below certain
thresholds. Establishing these thresholds with certainty, with the help of more powerful models and more
input from biologists and ecologists would be another interesting research objective.
Another interesting research direction will be to study how to reflect in our computations the similarity
between different software components. One possibility would be to further establish analogies with biological
ecosystems and their kinships as measured by genetic similitude. Common lines of code could be used as an
initial consanguinity factor to more accurately measure diversity. In many cases this is a proprietary secret
(How many lines of code have Windows 7 and XP?) but in others (Android, Linux) this data is readily
available or relatively easy to obtain. Adapting the mathematical model proposed in this work to take into
account this code and vulnerability similarities would also be a very interesting research avenue.
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